God, Nature and Connections: Malebranche’s Conception of Causality and Locke’s Critiques

Abstract

This article considers the arguments and essential passages of the Malebranchian theory of causality in order to focus on and analytically examine the conception of the relationships between God, creatures and the entire universe that it implies. The aim is to show, first of all, how the Malebranchian position is defined starting from a sharp critique of the “pagan” notion of nature, asserting the need to eliminate any God-nature dualism, reducing the latter to the legality established by the former. It then examines Malebranche’s occasionalist paradigm as a theory of the links between God and creatures and of the connections within the cosmos. Finally, Locke’s objections to Malebranche and Locke’s conception of power and relations between things are analysed, highlighting the fundamental differences between the two positions.