Analisi e Diritto <p>«Analisi e Diritto» is a six-montly, double blind peer-reviewed journal on analytic studies in Law and Philosophy of law.</p> en-US <p>Copyrights are transferred for five years starting publication date from the author(s) to the Publisher. After this period, the content is released under a Creative Commons licence (<a title="CC BY-SA 4.0" href="" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International</a>).</p> (Analisi e Diritto) (Giovanni Campolo) Fri, 15 Feb 2019 11:29:23 +0100 OJS 60 The Uncertain Limits of Law. Some Remarks on Legal Positivism and Legal Systems <p>Legal positivists often claim that law is a limited normative domain. Understanding the limits of law requires an answer to two related problems. On the one hand, the problem of unregulated cases and, on the other hand, the problem of the alien norms. The first problem refers to the distinction between legal gaps and unregulated cases. Many legal philosophers claim that the identification of legal gaps presupposes an evaluative judgment. Thus, contrary to legal positivism, the determination of the content and limits of law (i.e., the domain of regulated cases) does not only depend on the cognition of certain social facts, but it actually also requires an evaluation of such facts. The second problem refers to the fact that judges often recognize as legally binding norms that are not issued by competent authorities of their systems. Therefore, a positivistic theory would not provide a satisfactory account of law if it failed to explain the legal force of this kind of norms. In this paper I analyze some solutions to such problems that can be found in three well-known positivistic theories (Kelsen, Raz and Bulygin). I show that none of them offers a sound answer to the problem of the unregulated cases and the alien norms.</p> Pablo Navarro ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:08:18 +0100 Conversational Implicatures and Legal Interpretation <p>Currently, there is an ongoing debate which involves legal scholars, as well as philosophers of language and pragmatists, about the applicability of Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures to legal statutes, i.e. about the possibility of interpreting legal statutes according to Grice’s conversational maxims (or maxims that are similar to Grice’s ones). The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to provide a clear reconstruction of the debate at stake; second, to advance an argument within that debate. After a brief presentation of Grice’s theory (§2), I will examine the arguments that have been advanced in favour of and against the possibility of interpreting legal statutes according to Grice’s model (§3), and then I will argue that the dispute should be engaged on a factual level. My thesis is that even if some legal interpretative criteria have a content similar to that of conversational maxims, their functioning is totally different, because they are not based on the existence of a mutual general expectation.</p> Francesca Poggi ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 23 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0100 A recursive definition of evidential reasoning <p>The statement that evidential reasoning is a chain of reasoning is almost common place. However, this statement is not accompanied by complementary theses that specify the links in the chain. Consequently, this statement remains without justification. In my opinion, the only way to present evidential reasoning as a chain of reasoning is through a recursive definition, which defines the notion of sentence that, according to the law, can belong to evidential reasoning. The main goal of this paper is to present a definition, which will allow us to distinguish between the sentences that, according to the law, can belong to evidential reasoning as initial premises and those that, according to the law, can belong to evidential reasoning as conclusions</p> Rafael Hernández Marín ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 21 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100 Verità, conoscenza e incertezza processuale da Ferrajoli ai “teorici del fatto” <p>This work analyses the influence Ferrajoli has had on a part of juridical scholars (i.e. the so-called “fact-theorists”) on the topics of truth, procedural knowledge, and certainty. The paper essentially questions the occurrence of “rehabilitation” of alethic realism in the legal field and the ways the notion of truth has been analysed and justified by these theorists.</p> Elena Marchese ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 21 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100 Possible worlds semantics and deontic accessibility <p>This paper is meant to criticize the application of possible worlds semantics (PWS) to deontic logic and the analysis of normative language. After briefly presenting the main notions and tenets of PWS (§3) – with a special attention to the accessibility relation between possible worlds – and the analogy between modalities and quantifiers it aims at accommodating in a unified framework (§2), I reconstruct some general objections against this model (§4) and expose some arguments which undermine its applicability to deontic logic (§5). More precisely, I argue that PWS definitions of the deontic modalities are subtly circular.</p> Nicola Muffato ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 21 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100 Logic in law. A response to Riccardo Guastini <p>This paper, originated from a criticism by Riccardo Guastini to my views about law and logic, concerns the role of logic in law, namely: a) in the construction of legal theory; b) in the reasoning of legal science; c) in the reasoning and operations of legal practitioners, particularly judges</p> Luigi Ferrajoli ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 21 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100