Analisi e Diritto
https://www.journal.edizioniets.eu/index.php/aed
<p>«Analisi e Diritto» is a six-montly, double blind peer-reviewed journal on analytic studies in Law and Philosophy of law.</p>Edizioni ETSen-USAnalisi e Diritto1126-5779<p>Copyrights are transferred for five years starting publication date from the author(s) to the Publisher. After this period, the content is released under a Creative Commons licence (<a title="CC BY-SA 4.0" href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International</a>).</p>Foreword
https://www.journal.edizioniets.eu/index.php/aed/article/view/874
<p>Foreword to the issue 23 /2 (2023) of Analisi e Diritto</p>Natalia Scavuzzo
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2023-12-202023-12-20232Interpretation, Truth, and the Logical Form of Interpretive Discourse
https://www.journal.edizioniets.eu/index.php/aed/article/view/875
<p>The paper purports to provide an analytical treatment of the truth and legal interpretation issue. In the first part, it lays down a conceptual apparatus meant to capture the main aspects of the legal interpretation phenomenon, with particular attention paid to the several kinds of linguistic outputs (interpretive sentences in a broad sense) resulting from interpretive activities (in a broad sense). In the second part, it recalls three different notions of truth (empirical truth, pragmatic truth, and systemic truth), focussing, so far as systemic truth is concerned, on the difference between deductive and rhetorical normative systems. In the third, and last, part, it shows in which ways the phenomenon of legal interpretation encompasses truth-apt entities, leaving the choice between austere and liberal alethic pluralism to the reader. A few, final, remarks address the formalism/scepticism problem.</p>Pierluigi Chiassoni
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2023-12-202023-12-2023210.4454/analisiediritto.v23i2.875Interpretation according to Chiassoni: The Unstable Balance between Moderate Cognitivism and Radical Skepticism
https://www.journal.edizioniets.eu/index.php/aed/article/view/876
<p>This paper examines Pierluigi Chiassoni’s defense of a moderate non-cognitivist or skeptical conception of legal interpretation. It tries to show, through at least three different arguments —one related to the distinction between norms and norm-formulations, another focused on the thesis of the universal methodological ambiguity, and another related to the framework of legally admissible meanings— that a moderate skeptical conception of legal interpretation seems to collapse either with a moderate version of cognitivism or with radical skepticism.</p>Jorge L. Rodríguez
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2023-12-202023-12-2023210.4454/analisiediritto.v23i2.876Is There a Non-Skeptical Alternative to Cognitivism? Regarding “¿Interpretación jurídica sin verdad?” by Pierluigi Chiassoni
https://www.journal.edizioniets.eu/index.php/aed/article/view/877
<p>This paper discusses the work “¿Interpretación jurídica sin verdad?” by Pierluigi Chiassoni, in which he raises the question of whether there is room for truth in the field of legal interpretation and in which he expressly defends the following theses: (1) empirical truth is not predictable from the result of interpretative activity (in its proper sense and practical function) and (2) cognitivism is a misconception regarding the nature of judicial interpretative activity. The criticisms presented in this paper are not so much with respect to these two theses (which are shared), but with respect to the methodological apparatus that Chiassoni develops to defend his theses, from which he seems to want to draw some consequences. The fundamental discrepancies presented here with Chiassoni’s theses concern his conception of Law as a system of norms (or provisions and norms) and practical rationality as purely instrumental rationality, which would be the deep presuppositions on which his construction rests.</p>Isabel Lifante-Vidal
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2023-12-202023-12-2023210.4454/analisiediritto.v23i2.877Commentary on Chapter I of El problema del significado jurídico by P. Chiassoni
https://www.journal.edizioniets.eu/index.php/aed/article/view/878
<p>This article is a commentary on chapter I of the book The Problem of Legal Meaning by Pierluigi Chiassoni. This work reconstructs the main ideas of the chapter. While accepting some of the these defended by the author, it discussed two of its central theses: 1) from the fact that the provisions of the sources of law are statements of natural language, it does not follow that its meaning is equivalent to the conventional linguistic meaning; and 2) that there is no room for truth in interpretation in its proper sense and practical terms.</p>Victoria Iturralde
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2023-12-202023-12-2023210.4454/analisiediritto.v23i2.878A Pragmatic Critique to Chiassoni’s Legal Realism
https://www.journal.edizioniets.eu/index.php/aed/article/view/879
<p>After a brief review of the debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism about the meaning of legal rules, we discuss some aspects of the “pragmatic realism” proposed by Pierlugi Chiassoni (Fontamara, 2019) related to: i) the equivalence of the “practical field” as that within which legal practice takes place, to the “ideological or moral field”; ii) his notion of meaning as interpretation or translation, claiming it incurs the error shown by the Wittgensteinian argument of the infinite regress, iii) his “interpretive games”, about which we raise some questions regarding their intralinguistic nature, iv) his assumption that for any kind of cognoscitivism “understanding” or “grasping” the meaning of the disposition necessarily refers to its “linguistic meaning”. At the same time, we propose a reformulation of cognitivism in terms of know-how (replacing know that) that we call “pragmatic cognitivism”. With this we aim to overcome the debate between cognitivists and skeptics regarding the meaning of legal rules, suggesting that this pragmatic conception leads to a notion of objectivity, contrary to the skepticism supported by Chiassoni.</p>Juan Pablo AlonsoMaría Gabriela Scataglini
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2023-12-202023-12-2023210.4454/analisiediritto.v23i2.879Reflections of a Tightrope Walker
https://www.journal.edizioniets.eu/index.php/aed/article/view/880
<p>By way of a reply to the critical commentaries of Juan Pablo Alonso and Gabriela Scataglini, Omar Darío Heffes, Vitoria Iturralde, Santiago Legarre, Isabel Lifante-Vidal, Diego Luna, and Jorge Rodríguez, the paper purports to provide a perhaps clearer account of the reasons for accepting analytic non-cognitivism as a sound theory of legal interpretation, coping with problems which range from the defense of its own conceptual apparatus (focusing on the key notion of textual interpretation) to the relations with ethical pluralism, ethical relativism, egologic realism, constructivist non-cognitivism, linguistic conventionalism, radical scepticism, moderate non-cognitivism, and pragmatic non-cognitivism.</p>Pierluigi Chiassoni
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2023-12-202023-12-2023210.4454/analisiediritto.v23i2.880Non-application and Justified Violation of Norms. A Proposal for the Study of Defeasibility in the Theory of Law
https://www.journal.edizioniets.eu/index.php/aed/article/view/881
<p>This paper argues that the main conceptualisations of the notion of defeasibility proposed by legal theorists are useful to reconstruct and clarify two different processes. First, legal theorists use the concept of defeasibility to represent a process and the result of a restrictive reinterpretation in which a judge decides that a particular norm is no longer relevant for the regulation of an individual case. Secondly, legal theorists use the concept of defeasibility to describe a process and the result of justifying the non-application of a relevant norm to an individual case.</p>Víctor García Yzaguirre
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2023-12-202023-12-2023210.4454/analisiediritto.v23i2.881A Short Lesson on Equality under the Italian Constitution
https://www.journal.edizioniets.eu/index.php/aed/article/view/882
<p>The paper bears upon the double constitutional provision on equality, legal and social respectively, in the Italian legal system, mainly from the standpoint of the theory of legal interpretation. As to legal equality, five main subjects are discussed: (1) the addressee of the equality clause; (2) the question whether such a clause expresses a rule or a principle; (3) the Constitutional Court’s interpretation that construes equality, understood as a principle, as a requirement of reasonableness of legislation; (4) the way in which equality works as a gap creating machine and the nature of axiological gaps; (5) how the equality clause is used to justify constitutional rule-adding decisions, i.e., decisions that introduce new rules into the legal system. As to social equality, the paper argues that the corresponding constitutional clause amounts to a political directive of equalization (addressed to the legislature), which justifies affirmative actions but is in conflict with legal equality.</p>Riccardo Guastini
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2023-12-202023-12-2023210.4454/analisiediritto.v23i2.882